May 07, 2009.
Introduction:
The aim of this article is to raise more awareness and draw attention of the Somali Transitional Unity Government, leadership elites and the international community on the thirty-year running violence and misery which has culminated into unprecedented high dangerous levels of deep and widespread poverty that endangers lives of millions of Somalis which should not be taken business as usual. According to UN the number people in dire need have increased 77% in 2008 compared to late 2007 and only 26% of the necessary funding has been secured due to obvious donor fatigue and lack of political will on the part of donor countries. Also in addition to the severe droughts of the last four years, the current Gu’ (spring) rains fell much below than usual which will, of course, cause many more pastoralists and farmers to dispossession and humanitarian emergency situation. All these constitute a great cause of alarm that should be taken seriously and at the end of the writing I recommend to all the above parties to pay extra attention on this bleak situation and take proactive actions to save the lives of millions of Somalis. Much of the compilation the data and statements humanitarian crisis and poverty in this piece of writing are mainly drawn from UN sources and others.
1. Effects of Decades of Misgovernance, Violence and Foreign Military Interventions.
During the last thirty years our country has been under the crucibles of misgovernance, brutal and endless civil war violence, and interested foreign interventions which incrementally caused deep and rampant poverty. As a result of this our nation has been broken, lost its central government, fragmented, and our people are being either decimated or compelled to flee outside en mass to seek safe haven - an extermination process which, if not stopped, may result in that the Somali population will be mostly exterminated and the country empty and lost. These problems afflicting our nation emanate from negative accumulative effects from the following historical episodes.
1) The 1977-1978 Somali-Ethiopian war and related stoppage of cheap Soviet oil and military hardware and logistical supplies and huge numbers of scholarship grants;
2) The more repressive nature of the authoritarian regime and stifling grip on the socio-economic forces particularly from that period;
3) the economic and social pressure brought about by nearly a million ethnic and Oromo refugees from Ethiopia resulting from that war;
4) the imposition of IMF and World Bank conditional Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on the Somali economy in the 1980s after its introduction the country’s situation was described ‘Somalia’s is one of the world’s poorest countries, with stagnating economy which is frequently close to collapse. Many of its people live at a level of absolute poverty.’(1);
5) The 1979-1990; costly civil war between the government and based armed opposition groups based in Ethiopia and frequent direct military confrontations the two countries ;
6) The 1991-12006 disintegration of the central government and break-out of the devastating and prolonged civil war;
7) The US led UN (UNISOM) 1992-1995 military intervention and its aftermath of isolating and neglecting Somalia by the international community;
8) The 2006 fighting between the CIA backed Somali warlords and the Islamic Courts; and
9) lastly the 2006-2008 US-backed socio-economically most devastating Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia.. All these difficulty periods have had severely destructive and emboweling impacts on the socio-economic and political system of the country and have been incrementally creating social and territorial fragmentation, mass international displacement and refugees to the outside world, radicalization, poverty, ignorance, diseases, morbidity and early mortality.
2. 1995-2006 : Emergence of New Somali Socio-Economic Modus Vivendi Model
However, the Somalis have been coping with these social and economic hardships they have been undergoing with extraordinary and unique stamina, resourcefulness, and resilience. Both in the more volatile south/central regions or in the more peaceful self-administering territories of Somaliland and Puntland there have been relatively thriving social and economic activity where all sorts of medium size, small traders, vendors, and brokers have been engaging and moving all kinds of trade activities throughout the country, import and export flowing, nomads and farmers making sustenance from their herds and farms, Somali shilling circulating and exchange rate with foreign currencies being fixed and regulated, tens of thousands of children going to basic schools in almost all towns and villages, secondary schools in most cities and even universities (in Amud, Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Bossaso, ) and over a billion dollars remittance being sent by Somali emigrants to support their families and relatives or to invest and set up various private businesses (e.g. satellite telecom firms, small factories, import-export trade companies, etc.) and free mushrooming media (Somali newspapers, Radios and TVs, Internet websites, etc.). Millions of people (the majority of the population) who have been under the poverty line depended on the trickle-down of this self-propelling relatively vibrant economy in variety of ways – through labor, brokerage, selling goods for commission, loans, personal grants to empower small traders, vendors, peddlers, shari-shari (small errand trader), you name it, and benefited from generous Somali traditional social security system in either formal charitable provisions, personal alms, customary social hospitality and solidarity of give and take between extended families, relatives, friends sharing, lending, etc. etc.
Although it was a precarious one such unique survival socio-economic system worked fairly well without central government and central bank regulation, backing, guarantees and protection as acknowledged by the 2005 World Bank Report. This Somali socio-economic modus vivendi model envied and admired by many has not been supported by any international development aid either except non-developmental lifesaving and dependency creating humanitarian relief aid by UN agencies and Ingo’s for needy groups of people displaced by violence or affected by drought and alluvial floods or limited support for education, healthcare, and for water supply programmes in certain areas. This has been possible due to the Somali strong character, self-confidence, indigenous entrepreneurial spirit, resourcefulness, traditional generous hospitality and social solidarity, and survival strategies rooted in their historical tradition of self-sustenance for centuries in a tough environment. But these extraordinary qualities seem to have been drained and overwhelmed by the relentless turmoil, enormity and gravity of the problems.
3.Crippling Effects of the Ethiopian Occupation on the Somali Socio-Economic System
Five months before the Ethiopian invasion and occupation, there were only 400,000 protracted internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from the then 16 years civil war and 1.4 million people affected by droughts and river alluvial floods – altogether 1.8 millions in acute food and livelihood crisis and humanitarian emergency according to the UN (FAO 31/8/06).
Unfortunately, the above described relatively thriving unique Somali socio-economic modus vivendi system has began to collapse after the Ethiopian occupation troops and its allied TFG government had occupied in the Somali capital and other south-central regions from December 2006 and almost totally destroyed the main emporium and backbone of the Somali economy in Mogadishu city during the two years of 2007 and 2008. Thousands of homes, countless businesses, moveable properties, money, many thriving markets and their goods including the famous Bakaraha Market (which was the financial and stock centre for whole of Somalia), and many educational and health institutions, etc., etc. worthy of many hundreds of millions if not in the billions (because nobody yet formally estimated) have been destroyed. As a result over a million people have been dispossessed and displaced from the city while the rest of the remaining population have also been completely or partially dispossessed. In addition the local traditional social solidarity system and charity networks on which millions depended have been destroyed and disrupted too. Mogadishu, the thriving main economic nerve and hub of the country which used to both supply and draw economically from all parts of the country, neighbouring countries and the Emirates and other countries, has mostly become a deserted ghost city.
3.1 Economic Collapse and Unfolding of an Unprecedented Humanitarian Catastrophe
The figures and statements dealt here are incomplete economic as there has not been a comprehensive survey and data collection based on real basic production and productive forces such industrial and agricultural outputs, labour and productivity, import-export and terms and balance of trade, fiscal and monetary elements such revenue and budget, banking and insurance systems, etc. but on some UN empirical reports about the manifestations of market prices, inflation, and humanitarian and poverty statistics which are as a result inadequate and cannot portray the real economic situation or poverty levels prevailing in the country due to the insecurity and lack of access to all regions to find out all that necessary information.
Consequently, within four months of the Ethiopian occupation’s devastating actions, the UN top Humanitarian Affairs declared ‘In terms of numbers and access to them Somalia is a worse displacement crisis than Darfur or Chad or anywhere else this year’(2) in reference to the massive displaced people and the rest of the dispossessed population trapped in the city. This humanitarian disaster unprecedented in the history of Somalia has split over to other regions which were negatively impacted by this rapacious and destructive occupation or received and hosted tens of thousands of IDPs from Mogadishu.
Thereafter, the humanitarian situation started to constantly and rapidly deteriorate. On 23rd July 2008 the UN OCHA issued warning report that in Somalia the humanitarian situation ‘was fasting deteriorating’ and ‘in January (2008) the target (needy) population was 1.5 million’ and again on 8 August 2008 the UN estimated ‘that 2.6 million people in Somalia need aid, a 40 percent increase in the number of vulnerable people since January. Some 3.5 million Somalis or half the total population could require assistance by the end of the year - an increase of 900,000 people in one month.’(3) Later after four months the above figure of 3.5 million was rectified as ‘3.2 million people in Somalia – 43 per cent of the population – are in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the combined effects of conflict and drought’ (4) without any explanation. Did the 300,000 people left out died or become well-off? Or was the previous number was inflated? The report added that ‘Despite the challenging security circumstances in Somalia, WFP has managed to provide food aid to more than 1.5 million needy people in the country each month. WFP shipped some 260,000 metric tons of food to Somalia in 2008, almost four times what it provided in 2007 ’ which means the UN and other humanitarian agencies were unable to provide food aid to 1.7 million people who were either in ‘Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC) and Humanitarian Emergency (HE) according to the UN itself. Out of the above figure of 3.2 million, ‘1.2 million are rural people in crisis’ and 2 million people, are urban poor and internally displaced population -IDPs.’ (5)
Since then the humanitarian crisis has been deteriorating from one unprecedented level to another. Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar accused the Bush US Administration for the destruction of Somalia by stating ‘The Ethiopian invasion, which was sanctioned by the U.S. government, has destroyed virtually all the life-sustaining economic systems which the population has built for the last fifteen years.’(6) The UN too in directly acknowledged that the occupation forces created this humanitarian catastrophe by declaring ‘the worst humanitarian situations in the last 17 years’ (7) which means that the situation has so dramatically deteriorated during the last two years that Somalia was under Ethiopian occupation. On 7 October 2008, 52 international and national NGOs dealing with Somalia in a press release drew the attention of the international actors to their failure in addressing the runaway inflation and sky-high prices and dismal humanitarian situation prevailing and directed this blame
A New York Times correspondent journalist reported a famine prevailing in the central regions where ‘many Somalis are trying to stave off starvation with a thin gruel made from mashed thorn-tree branches called jerrin’(8) in Galgadud and Galmudug. The Resident and Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs for Somalia warned ‘Somalia is really at a stage where the situation is getting increasingly acute and a cause for major concern.’(9). and UNICEF warned that ‘It is our view that 2009 will break or make of security-wise and humanitarian-wise for the Somali people.’ (10)
There is growing urban Poverty. According to the UN there are 705,000 urban poor people (22% of urban population) living in the main cities like Afgoi, Mogadishu, Dusa Mareb, Las Anood, Bossaso, Erigavo, and Burao and rural settlements of whom 556,000 are in Acute food and Livelihood crisis (AFLC) 140,000 are in Humanitarian Emergency (HE). Additionally, there are an ‘estimated 1 million new IDPs from the increased conflict over the last two years, plus 275,000 protracted IDPs, who are equally affected by the food price crisis.’ And ‘The rural crisis is more severe in that more than half or 680,000 people are in Humanitarian Emergency (HE), requiring emergency livelihood and life-saving’ in April 2008 and ‘the largest concentrations of rural populations in crisis are in the south (66%) and central regions (29%). Increased civil insecurity is leading to distressed population movement both internally and cross-border. Since July ’08, it is estimated that the number of IDPs has increased from 870,000 to 1,020,000 (UNHCR, January 9, ’08), and there are more than 275,000 protracted IDPs.’(11) while keeping in mind that there are multitude of poor and destitute people not reached out and reported by the UN and other humanitarian agencies because of inaccessibility due to insecurity as UN itself conceded ‘At present, south-central Somalia is almost entirely off limits to the international staff of aid agencies.’(12) For example, ‘Twenty four (24 ) aid workers, of whom 20 were Somalis and four (4) foreigners, have been intentionally killed and were missing in Somalia especially in Mogadishu and adjacent regions in 2008’(13) and there were country-wide 153 security incidents on in January 2009 (same report).which came down to 75 incidents in February 2009 – a 51% reduction.’’(14)
In this connection, sparing direct blame from the Ethiopian occupation forces’ devastation and policy of ‘kill by bullet and starvation’, a US academic and Somali analyst succinctly described the aid obstruction by the Ethiopian troops and then TFG leaders in this way ‘The humanitarian nightmare in Somalia is the result of a lethal cocktail of factors. The large-scale displacement caused by the fighting in Mogadishu is the most important driver. The displaced have fled mainly into the interior of the country, where they lack access to food, clean water, basic health care, livelihoods, and support networks. . . . IDPs, are among the most vulnerable populations in any humanitarian emergency. He adds ‘Humanitarian agencies in Somalia are facing daunting obstacles to delivery of food aid. There is now virtually no “humanitarian space” in which aid can safely be delivered. Until recently, the TFG and its uncontrolled security forces were mainly responsible for most obstacles to delivery of food aid. TFG hardliners view the provision of assistance to IDPs as support to an enemy population—terrorists and terrorist sympathizers in their view—and have sought to impede the flow of aid convoys through a combination of bureaucratic and security impediments. Uncontrolled and predatory TFG security forces, along with opportunistic criminal gangs, have erected over 400 militia roadblocks (each of which demands as much as $500 per truck to pass) and have kidnapped local aid workers for ransom.’ (15)
On 2/10/2008 the British Magazine The Economist acknowledged that during the two years period of the Ethiopian occupation period Somalia has been ruined by these words ‘Over the past 18 months, Somalia has descended into a terrible levels of displacement and humanitarian need, armed conflict and assassinations, political meltdown, radicalization and virulent anti-Americanism.’ And on 12/11/2008 Reuters joined the few Western media agencies which acknowledged the disaster in the making in Somalia by writing ‘Somalis are suffering dreadfully as violence compounds the misery caused by drought and soaring food prices in a country that was already one of the world’s poorest. About one million Somalis are international refugees. Aid workers, hampered by attacks on them, say it is one of the world’s worst crisis’ while on 5/12/2008 fifty two (52) NGOs dealing with Somalia declared ‘The international community has completely failed Somali civilians. The average Somali has seen price increases for food ad water of up to 1,000 per cent plunging many into worsening poverty’ –said the 52 NGOs. ‘At present, south-central Somalia is almost entirely off limits to the international staff of aid agencies.’(16)’ while ‘70% of the population lacks reliable access to safe water.’ (17).
The severe drought effects in the country especially the pastoral hinterlands during the last couple of years have not yet been fully assessed because of inaccessibility due to insecurity. Even so, the UN could sum up the situation as ‘A severe water shortage and deepening drought in many parts of Somalia is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the country. Field reports confirm livestock are dying in huge numbers and remaining water sources cannot meet both humans and livestock needs. Humanitarian agencies are trucking water in the most critical areas but activities are far from meeting the enormous needs. . . The deepening drought in Somalia provides a continuing basis for concern as it is accompanied by high rates of malnutrition and the long term loss of assets and livelihoods’ (18) but complete numbers of livestock lost and people perished were not given.
For the period of Diraac 2008-2009 (Jiilaal) the UN and other sources have collected the following anecdotic and inadequate figures and statements at the beginning of the drought season. In Galgadud region due to drought and recent fighting there is serious humanitarian crisis apart from the 130,000 IDPs from Mogadishu complicated by deteriorating security. (19); in Galmudug besides the already known 40 -50,000 IDPS from Mogadishu, the UN reported 38,000 nomads in Galmudug needed immediate assistance. (20), in El Dheer district of Middle Shabelle ’30% of goats and sheep and 40% of cattle’ are said to have died. (21) And in Puntland some 400 nomadic families [2,400 people]. Pastoralists who lost they their livestock flock to cities where (22) that various relief agencies distributed food 220,000 drought victims in the following regions: 36,019 households in Gedo region, 60,000 and 10,000 households in Galgadud and southern Mudug (Galmudug) regions respectively and 20,000 beneficiaries (3,250 households) in Bay, Bakool and Hiran; and additional 48,000 people in Bakool region and 54,000 people in Gedo and Bay regions. (23)
On top of that, concerned of the disastrous humanitarian situation in Somalia in general and the current Gu’(spring) rain shortfall much below its normal level which ensues the severe droughts of the last four years that decimated most of the pastoralists’ livestock in particular, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Mark Bowden, a in letter (24/4//2009) addressed to the Somali people asking them to work together in this difficulty time and making assurances that the UN will do more to save lives and alleviate the hardships of the Somali needy millions as much as they can, he laments that the humanitarian agencies cannot have access to and unable to reach out many populations in needy due to insecurity especially parts in the south/central regions and Mogadishu where there are killings and abductions of aid workers of whom 18 are currently under captivity of their abductors. Mr. Bowden appreciates the social and economic developmental contributions played by the Somali Diaspora in Somalia in the past years which he says have recently shrunken owing to the effects of the Global Recession where the Somalia Diaspora communities live and that the UN plans to help encourage such contribution and efforts of he Diaspora. Finally, he appeals to the Somali ‘community leaders, elders ad the people to help ensure the security and safety of humanitarian staff’.
3.2 The Plight of the Somali Children
Our children, being the most vulnerable section of the society, have been afflicted most in terms of death rates, suffering and future wise. UN and other data banks estimate every 1,000 births 215 children die. This is one of the highest infant mortality rats in the world. Not only the infants, but many thousands of other children of all ranges of age and mothers are also being killed by malnutrition, starvation, diseases, violence, and adventurous dangerous migration in the high seas and oceans every year. On 27/11/2007 UNICEF issued an alarming report that ‘105,000 under-five-year children’ were ‘at risk to die for malnutrition. 83,000 of them ‘acutely malnourished’ and ‘13,500’ were ‘severely malnourished.’ These under-five years children and most of the other displaced needy older children and adults have the highest malnutrition rate in the world – ‘19% and ‘21.5% among the under five children’ and again on 5/12/2007 UNICEF’s Representative for Somalia declared “95 per cent of Somali children under the age of five have not received the full recommended course of vaccinations. Somalia has some of the worst social indicators for children in the world, one in eight children dies before his fifth birthday, one in three is chronically malnourished, hardly a third of families have access to clean drinking water, just 30 per cent of children go to school and on average people only live to the age of 47.’(24) and UN OCHA’s survey in El Berde district of Bakool found ‘critical rates of malnutrition with 24.1% rate of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and a 2.8% rate of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). Contingency planning and preparations for the worst case scenario will be critical if response is to be timely and at appropriate level. Somalia.’(25) After about two months the UN OCHA reported that Qanasaxdheere, Baidoa, and Tiyaglow districts have had the same highest and acute malnutrition rates of 24.1% among the children and people as El Bedre and Bakool districts.(26)
The UN OCHA again warned that ‘The current environment of conflict, displacement and insecurity in southern and central Somalia has a seriously negative impact on children’s and young peoples’ long-term psycho-social welfare and healthy development.’(26) and in September 2008 another UN agency disclosed that children Lower and Middle Shabelle Regions ‘have the highest caseload of acutely and severely malnourished children in Somalia, estimated at 34% and 38% respectively’ (27) and in December 2008 IRIN revealed that the ‘Global acute malnutrition is rising from 20% to 28% and 30% which ‘indicate a famine situation’ (28) which is double the world average malnutrition rate of 15 per cent. The Lower and Middle Shabelle regions have the highest’ (28) while in the same month AP reported quoting the UN that ‘There are 300,000 acutely malnourished children in Somalia.’(29) In the same month UN News centre revealed that ‘200,00 are under five children acutely and severely malnourished’ in Somalia of whom ’60,00 are acutely malnourished …and at an increased risk of death if they do not receive the appropriate specialist care. …These extreme numbers will have a long-term devastating impact on the economic potential of the country.’ (30) and the UN agency of IRIN repeated such bleak picture of Somali children that ‘Somalia has one of the world’s highest levels of malnutrition, with Global Acute and Malnutrition rates of an estimated 18.6, topping 20 per cent in some areas, and 28 per cent in displaced people’s camps in Bossaso, Northeast Somalia,. Any thing over 15 per cent (malnutrition rate) can be regarded as an emergency.’(31) Another UN source made clear that programmes for ‘Education, Shelter and Safety & Security sectors have received no funding.’(32)
Breastfeeding Problem: UNIFCEF discloses that ‘only 13 percent of Somali infants younger than six months are exclusively breastfed’ and as a result Somali infants need to get a breastfeed substitute called Plumpy’doz to boost their immune system (34) without given any explanation why 87% mothers do not breastfeed children of the this age range. Perhaps most mothers are so malnourished and weak that they cannot breastfeed their infant children or continue breastfeeding longer time.
In a new development on 17/4/2009 in a Press Release UNICEF hopes it will feed 300,000 Somali children in acute food and livelihood crisis of whom 96,000 are in humanitarian emergency. At the same time UNICEF is concerned that the fulfillment of the programmes for the Somali children and women will diminish in 2009 as for this year’s humanitarian funds appeal raised only $80 million which is enough only and until mid April 2009.
The following figures and statements about hyperinflation and sky-high prices also show how the relatively functioning and thriving Somali economic modus vivendi model was destroyed and poverty is deepened and widespread.
3. 4 Hyperinflation and Sky-high Prices
As a consequence of the confluence of the devastating economic destruction by the afore-said occupation during 2007 and 2008, the terrible devaluation and hyperinflation caused by the printing of valueless paper money by the TFG and connected racketeering businessmen, the sky-high world food shortages and prices hikes, and exacerbated by the global economic recession from the last half of 2008, food has increasingly become very scarce and prices still continued to sky-rocket in Somalia destroying the meagre incomes and living standards of the masses and many millions to a situation of absolute destitution and humanitarian emergency as narrated above.
According to UN source Somalia imports 60% of its food consumption, which means that 40% is internally produced, and the price of imported food and nonfood items rose to unprecedented levels and in some instances to 383% during the 12 months prior to May 2008. The exchange rate of the Somali shilling against US$1 was continuously fluctuating between 30,000 and 34,000 – a record historic high rise of 125% rise within the 4 months before May 2008. (33) Another UN source stated that ‘price of cereals increased between 340 and 700 per cent in the last year’ that is 2007 and ‘One of the main driving factors of the crisis is the escalating civil insecurity, which is not only leading to human suffering in terms of killings, violence, human rights abuses, and population displacement’(34) in Somalia obviously referring indirectly to the policy of the Ethiopian occupation and the TFG in obstructing the humanitarian aid to reach the needy people and insecurity created by the fight between them and the Somali anti-occupation forces.
Fifty two (52) INGOs dealing with Somalia declared ‘The international community has completely failed Somali civilians. The average Somali has seen price increases for food ad water of up to 1,000 per cent plunging many into worsening poverty’ – said the 52 NGOs. ‘At present, south-central Somalia is almost entirely off limits to the international staff of aid agencies.’ (35) while ‘70% of the population lacks reliable access to safe water’ (36)
The following eight tables show some examples of how the prices of some basic food items and have been sky-rocketing and Somali Shilling become devalued from January 2007 just after Mogadishu and south/central regions of Somalia haven been invaded and occupied by the Ethiopian Troops and how during the whole period of the two years of this occupation, i.e., 2007 and 2008, these prices and the Somali continued to rise and Somali shilling plummeted steeply.
Table 1: Devaluation of the Somali Shilling to the US Dollar from 2007 to 2008 (37) and last column is from UN Source: (38)
March 2006
Exchange rate of Somali Shilling to US$1
13,400
February 2007
=
15,000
March 2008
=
25,000
July 2008
=
35,000
May 2008
=
30,000-34,000
Table 2: Some Anecdotic Data Drawn from UN Source: (39)
Some basic food Items
Place
Price in So.Shs per Kg.
Period
% Rise
Sorghum
Baidoa
6,666 -9,833
Jan-April’08
201%?
Wheat flour
Hudur
April’07 –April’08
146%
Sorghum
Baidoa
April’07
379%
Sorghum
Hudur
April’07
383%
White Maize
Central regions
Jan-April’08
167%-390%
Sorghum
Baidoa
5,150
April’08
Sorghum
Bardera
3,600
April’08
Sorghum
Hudur
7,250
April’08
Sorghum
Belet Weyne
7,500
April’08
Sorghum
The two Shabelle Regions
7,111
April’08
Sorghum
Central regions
10,000
April’08
Wheat flour
Baidoa
April’08
176%
Drum of Water
Hawd area
80,000-100,000
March’08
Drum of water
Sool and Sanaag regions
120,000-150,000
March’08
Table 3: Average Retail price of Rice in selected Markets, Jan.’07 Compared
to April’08 from UN Source (40)
Market
April 2008 price So.Shs.
Compared to Jan.2008 price in So.
% Change
Afmadow
27,250
8,000
241
Merka
27,000
5,875
359
Jamame
25,500
6,500
292
Mogadishu
24,750
6,000
313
B/Weyne
28,250
7,000
304
Dusa Mareb
25,000
8,000
213
Galkayo
24,000
6,600
264
Jowhar
28,000
6,500
330
Burao
12,500
7,000
79
Erigavo
29,500
6,500
354
Table 4 :Comparison of Data of prices Rises of Five Basic Food Items
collected from inside Mogadishu in January 2007 and January 2008 (41)
S/No.
Basic food Item
Unit of Measurement
Price of January 2007 in So. shs.
Price in January 2008 in So.shs.
% Rose
1.
Sugar
50 Kg.
200,000
650,000
225%
2.
Flour
50 kg.
200,000
650,000
225%
3.
Rice
50 kg.
250,000
700,000
220%
4.
Carton of spaghetti
10 kg.
70,000
240,000
243%
5.
Cooking Oil
10 litres
300,000
540,000
80%
6
Powder milk
2.5 kg tin
200,000
440,000
120%
Table 5: Comparison of Data of prices Rises of Five Basic Food Items
collected from inside Mogadishu in price Rises of Five Basic Food
Items in January 2007(42) and January 2009 (43)
S/No.
Basic Food Item
Unit of Measurement
Price in January 2007 in So. Shs.
Price in Jan. 2009 in So. Shs.
% Rise
1.
Sugar
50 kgs.
200,000
800,000
300%
2.
Flour
50 kgs.
200,000
950,000
375%
3.
Rice
50 kgs.
250,000
1,250,000
400%
4.
Spaghetti
10 kgs.
70,000
450,000
543%
5.
Cooking oil
10 litres
300,000
540,000
80%
Table 6: Comparison of Data of Nine Basic Food Items collected from
inside Mogadishu in Jan 2006 and Jan 2007 (44)
S/no.
Item of food
Unit of Measurement
Price in Jan.2006 in So. Shs.
Price in Jan. 2007 in So. Shs
% change
1.
Sugar
50 kgs.
70,000
80,000
14.3%
2
Wheat Four
50 kgs.
50,000.
60,000.
20%
3
Rice
. 50 kgs.
60,000
550,000
817%
4
Spaghetti
10 kgs.
105,000
100,000
-4.7%
5
Cooking oil
10 litres
130,000
140,000
7.7%
6
Maize
100 kgs.
80,000
80,000
0%
7
Wheat
100 kgs.
60.000
70,000.
16.7%
8
Beans
100 kgs.
140.000
160,000
14.3%
9
Milk powder
9 kgs.
5000.
5,000
0%
Table 7: Comparison of Data of Nine Basic Food Items Collected From Inside Mogadishu in Jan 2007 and Jan 2008 (45)
S/no.
Item of food
Unit of Measurement
Price in Jan. Jan 2007
In So. Shs.
Price in Jan. 2008 2008 in So. Shs.
% change
1.
Sugar
50 kgs.
80.000
280.000
250%
2
Wheat Four
50 kgs.
60,000.
260,000
333%
3
Rice
. 50 kgs.
550,000
330,000
-40%
4
Spaghetti
10 kgs.
100,000
520,000
420%
5
Cooking oil
10 litres
140,000
300,000
114%
6
Maize
100 kgs.
80,000
250,000
213%
7
Wheat
100 kgs.
70,000
100,000
43%
8
Beans
100 kgs.
160,000
490,000
206%
9
Milk powder
9 kgs.
5,000
6,000
20%
Table 8: Comparison of Data of Nine Basic Food Items Collected From Inside Mogadishu in Jan 2008 and March 2009 (46).
S/no.
Item of food
Unit of Measurement
Price in Jan 2008 in So. shs.
Price in March. 2009 in So. Shs.
% change
1.
Sugar
50 kgs.
280,000
170.000
-39%
2
Wheat Four
50 kgs.
260,000
150,000
-42%
3
Rice
. 50 kgs.
330,000
180,000
45%
4
Spaghetti
10 kgs.
520,000
420,000
-19%
5
Cooking oil
10 litres
300,000
250,000
-17%
6
Maize
100 kgs.
250,000
160,000.
-36%
7
Wheat
100 kgs.
100,000
300,000
200%
8
Beans
100 kgs.
490,000
650,000
33%
9
Milk powder
9 kgs.
6,000
15,000
150%
A Comment on above tables:
Tables 1 – 7: mostly show sky-high increase of prices except price of spaghetti
in Table 6 and of rice in Table 7. But Table 8 mostly shows slight drops of prices or moderate prices rises of food items in 2008 except wheat and milk powder. Such slight drops or moderate increases of prices might either mean temporary release of food items from hoarding, or a decrease of the purchasing power of the people, and/or more humanitarian food temporarily saturating the market.
But prices of all these basic food items are still unusually very high compared to those of 2007 and 2008.
3.5 Poverty in Somaliland
Somaliland is also severely affected by sky-high prices, and the general deep and widespread poverty and misery prevailing in Somalia as a whole, as indicated by some UN reports concerning Burao, Sanaag, Awdal, Golis, Guban and related Hawd areas, as can be seen above. The following high prices of some basic food items in Hargeisa by Wargeyska Haatuf (17/3/2009) are also indicative of that although I have no detailed and specific information about the price hyperinflation of all the basic food items and the extent of the devaluation of the Somaliland shilling and which are said to exist there:-
1. Price of 50 kg. Of Sugar - $27
2. Price of 50 kg. Of Rice - $38 -51
3. Price of Wheat flour 50kgs - $25.50
4. Price of 10 liters of Cooking Oil - $9.50
3.6 The Second Wave of Exodus of Somali Refugees
After 1991-1994 big refugees exodus to the outside world, a new wave of migration has started during and after the Ethiopian invasion and occupation and its devastating effects on the Somali socio-economic system compounded by droughts and global economic recession. These numbers show this new wave of refugees fleeing their country due to grinding poverty and relentless conflict:-
a) In neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen) – 100,000 Somali refugees were registered 2008 (UNHCR, 18/3/2009).
b) In 2007 29,500 young people (over 90 percent Somalis) crossed the Gulf of Aden to Yemen by boats with 1,400 died (UNHCR 9/1/2009).
c) In 2008 the number of young crossing the sea to Yemen rose to 50,091 people with 590 died and 359 missing (presumed dead) – 70% increase of last year’s figure.(UNHCR 9/1/2009).
d) Up until 23 April 2009 19, 622 young people mostly Somalis crossed the sea to Yemen with 131 died and 66 missing - presumed dead (UNHCR 23/4/2009)
e) In the industrialized countries 21,800 Somalis sought asylum in 2008 –proportionally the largest number of all the seekers. ‘(47)
f) According to the Independent (17/4/2009), a British Newspaper, at the Kenyan border alone 500 Somalis refugees arrive every day to seeking safe refuge.
5.UNKNOWN EFFECTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN OCCUPATION AND GLOBAL RECESSION
Around the world countless big financial institutions banks, insurance firms and mortgage lenders, and businesses have become bankrupt around the world especially in the richest countries of America and Europe and governments bailed them out with hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue their financial systems and economies from collapsing. Even millionaires have been lost much of their fortunes. This economic turmoil also triggered of unprecedented levels of hyperinflation and soaring prices. All countries took emergent measures to mitigate this economic crisis and salvage their economies and avoid mass unemployment and social unrest. In doing so, among marshalling their resources, most countries asked the IMF and World Bank rescue loan plans.
But unfortunately the extent of the negative effects of the Ethiopian occupation and this global recession on the Somali economy and living standards are not yet known and measured except the scant information in the following in the few lines. Referring to the severe economic hardships in Somalia one UN report noted ‘In this context it is disturbing to see that remittances which form an important social safety net for many of the population have also declined by 15% as a result of the economic downturn. Both of these factors suggest that we should be doing more than we are to alleviate distressed populations from the extreme pressure they are now facing.’(48) and in another a UN agency said ‘A worsening drought, the global food crisis and a falling currency pushed the cost of imported cereals in Somalia up by almost 400 percent in 2007/2008, according to . . . FAO, and Somalia is behind Zimbabwe in the countries worst hit by food inflation.’ (49)
5.1. NEGATIVE HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY
Such prolonged cyclic and deep poverty trap in our country, at least in the last 30 years, has not only been a mass killer and painful misery but it has dire health and developmental consequences for our children both in the present and in the future and our nation’s viability. Such terrible consequences include vulnerability to diseases (both normal and epidemic ones), morbidity and high mortality rate of infants and children and shorter life expectancy of adults. Poverty also creates stunted physical growth of children and variety of physical and mental disabilities. Chronic malnutrition particularly the lack or low protein and energy seriously affects the growth and intelligence of children making them stunt and mentally dull (50) So, the protracted and prevailing mass poverty in our country, has been (will continue unless reversed) creating a physically stunted, mentally weak and prematurely decimated population in the medium term and the long run as well. These long running conflict and poverty will have dire psychological implications as UN OCHA warns. ‘The current environment of conflict, displacement and insecurity in southern and central Somalia has a seriously negative impact on children’s and young peoples’ long-term psycho-social welfare and healthy development’.
6. THE CORRELATION OF MISGOVERNANCE, VIOLENCE, FOREIGN INTERVENTION, POVERTY AND RADICALISATION
It is a common knowledge that misgovernance, violence, radicalization, foreign intervention, and poverty have correlation. Recent Somali history is abounding instances of the mutual relationship between these terms and their effects. The misgovernance by successive Somali governments especially during the 1979-1991 of the military authoritarian government (dictatorial repression, injustice, human rights abuses, civil war, etc.) fermented radicalization in popular attitudes which in turn led to social unrest in the end and gave rise to desperate situation of helplessness, discontent and poverty that drove the people to resort to take up arms to meet violence with counter-violence in the form of various opposition movements from the late 1970s to the late 1980s which were unfortunately essentially tribal both in form and content as they were inspired by the prevailing predominant tribal social mode and attitudes of society enlivened by the government of the time.
The official regime’s misgovernance and use of unstrained force and the popular counter-violence in the country from 1979 to 1991 caused massive destruction, massacres, poverty, and displacement in a number of central and northern regions especially in Hargeisa, Burao, Berbera cities and related districts and villages and eventually led to the disintegration of the central government in 1991. This first phase civil war and after the collapse of the central government, a second phase of all-out and prolonged civil war ensued in the south-central regions which brought about even greater bloodshed and destruction, displacement, gross human rights abuses, poverty, misery and radicalization manifesting in diverse tribal, mafia-like warlordism, criminal, and extreme forms.
Such mutual relationship between misgovernance, violence, radicalizations and poverty is also true for foreign intervention or domination. From 1992 there were a number of foreign interventions, i.e., the 1992-1995 US led UNISOM military intervention, the 2006 US backing of the Somali warlords against the Somali Islamic groups in Mogadishu, and again its backing of the Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia which all applied violence on the Somali people and compelled them to resort to counter-violence which resulted not only further loss of life, destruction, displacement, more destitution and poverty and radicalizations of peoples attitudes but also stirred and ignited of hitherto hardly existing politicized religious radical sectarian movements and unprecedented level of hatred for foreign interveners especially for the Ethiopian occupiers and the US Bush Administration which backed them as well as current situation of unprecedented radicalization particularly the emergence more radical and new brand Islamic groups like al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam in Somalia.
Hence, the correlation between misgovernance, violence, forceful foreign intervention, radicalizations and poverty.
7. FAILURE AND IRRESPONSIBILITY OF SOMALI LEADERSHIP ELITES
Who is responsible for the endless conflict and suffering of our nation? Before answering this question let’s first let’s ask this question, who leads a country or nation-state in this modern world? The answer is simple and straightforward. In this modern era a country or nation-state is led by its middle class people, in other words, the leadership elites – politicians, intellectuals, professionals, and business people. Normally in a collective and organised (in organisations and professional associations of national level with national vision) the middle class leadership elites guide, organise, serve, secure, defend and lead the nation-state or the country in the right way and direction.
But our leadership elites are neither organised in national political platforms equipped with common national vision and social values nor professional associations of common interests. These elites, who are supposed to have such organisations and social values and lead the nation seem to conform condescendingly to the low politics of the street flocks and related agnostic, clannish, irrational, emotional, fatalist, and defeatist views and world-views which shift the blame on God that He is punishing the nation as it strays from His way, or on individual narrow-minded and selfish political goons and brutal warlords, or on this or that clan, or on the older generation, and/or on foreigners. This is the low politics mentality and outlook of the yobsan (the crowd) or fadhi-ku-dirir (a term recently acquired from the civil war which means sitting or tea-shop political warriors of the crowd) of the above described petty politicking.
It is therefore pity that these supposed leadership elites should not realize that the myopic and selfish politicians and warlords, clans, and foreign intruders are not the kind of leaderships a nation-state needs or should lead it but they are destructive forces each contending to have a pound of flesh or bone from the body of our fallen state. So, Somali leadership elites should have risen above such little politics and little thinking or remaining passive critics.
Coming back to the question, who is responsible for the endless conflict and chaos of our nation? Answer is obviously quite clear.
It is the Somali leadership elites have become dismally failed to shoulder their social and national responsibility to guide, organise, serve, secure, defend and lead their nation in the right manner and direction, or to prevent such national disaster, in the first place, or resolve it afterwards. Thus, we, the leadership elites are responsible for the endless conflict and chaos of our nation. The leadership of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts Union has shown some humanitarian concern and provided relief aid for many Somalis affected by drought, river floods or displaced and dispossessed by the violence in their brief six month rule in Mogadishu and adjacent regions.All foreign observers and analysts of Somalia understood well this weakness and fiasco on the part of the Somali leadership elites but they are mostly either silent or uninterested to comment on this fact. Only man, i.e., Mr. Ahmed Ould-Abdullah, the Special Representative of he UN Secretary-General for Somalia has on several occasions shown honest and frank concern to tell privately and publicly the Somali leadership elites for their neglect and political failure to serve and uphold their people and country. On one occasion he appealed to them ‘I would like the parliamentarians to show their full support for the peace process and for their plight of the people of population’ because most of them were against the peace process he was leading (51). On another occasion he rebuked the Somali leadership elite for ‘Somalia is a victim of its political, business and military elite. They have taken the country hostage.’ (52) And on third one he addressed this blame on both the Somali leadership and the international community ‘The Somali leadership inside and abroad, as well as international community, have neglected Somalia for years’(53). for the conflict and misery in Somalia. Thus, every Somali knows well that, and if not he or she must know, that we, the political, intellectual/professional, military, and religio-political elites have been and are responsible for the prolonged conflict, prevailing crushing and widespread poverty and fragmentation of our nation, and that these remarks by Mr. Ould-Abdullah is just a further indisputable reconfirmation. Lastly, just only six days ago (1/5/2009) Thomas-Jensen of Project Enough pointed out in VOA that he believes ’17 years of failed (Somali) leadership’.
We, the Somali leadership elites, must therefore critically re-examine ourselves by putting aside the petty tribal and selfish mentality, allegiances and interests and as an alternative rise to organise ourselves into political platforms and social associations of national level and vision rallying around social peaceful and moderate political and social methods based on our best social values and finest global social values applicable to our context while making use of and putting into practice the available reservoir resources of our knowledge, experience, skills, intellectual capacity, honest and goodwill in order to reconstruct, lead, guide, serve, defend, and develop our nation to be secure, peaceful and prosperous nation-state which positively contributes to its neighbours and the rest of the world. Moreover, it is very urgent matter to take into account and pay attention on those millions whose lives are threatened by the grinding poverty either or are fleeing out of the country every month, just to die in the desperate journey on the high seas, or on known foreign land routes or end up in brutal dungeons around the world. They are expecting merciful exigent plans of their salvation from Somali Transitional Unity Government and leadership elites to speak on their behalf and launch urgent and proactive campaigns of raising awareness of the dangerous extent of the poverty and appealing to the conscience and goodwill of those Somalis who are better-off and the international community to do more to draw up urgent rescue plans and raise extra funds to save their lives from the real and imminent peril.
7.1 NEGLECT AND FAILURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND DONOR COUNTRIES
The UN and other humanitarian agencies have been doing their best to feed the starving millions of Somalis for many years. But now given that the people in acute food and livelihood crisis and humanitarian emergency have exponentially increased from 1.8 millions at the start of 2007 to 3.2 millions in 2008 and that still the numbers of the population in dire need tend to increase and overwhelm the humanitarian agencies and shrink their resources, that situation can not absolutely be business as usual. So, something urgent and different must be done.
Meantime, the community international, particularly the UN Security Council and main donor countries and organisations which have been politically and humanitarian wise involved in Somalia such as USA, EU member countries, Norway, and Arab countries, besides failing to stop the illegal Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia and hold accountable its war crimes and gross humanitarian rights violations which led to this latest unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Somalia, are dragging their feet to response to and recognise this dramatic increase of huge population in acute food and livelihood crisis and humanitarian emergency and provide them prompt and adequate humanitarian, and economic development aid so as to ward off further massive famine, and simultaneously address the burning security and political issues to enable Somalia to stand on its feet again.
7.2 Shortfall of Humanitarian Funding
This is a gross neglect and failure in the past 18 years or so on the part of the international community as regards Somalia’s gloomy situation which has been accumulated all these years. For example, while the Somali population in dire in 2008 rose to 77% in 2009 (I believe more) there has not been matching funding for that. Instead there is shortfall of funds and slow flow of them as indicated by the following results of the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for funds for 2009 and as UN agencies themselves admit.
The ‘the humanitarian community faces a shortfall in humanitarian funding for Somalia. Three months into 2009, the US$918 humanitarian appeal has raised only US$251 million or 26% of requirements. Education, Shelter and Safety & Security sectors have received no funding’ and ‘this is considerably lower compared to the funding level the same time last year of 35 percent. Of the $251 million received, 54 percent, or $136 million is carry over from late.’ (54) This means that the number of needy people almost doubled and funding decreased greatly proportionally. The same UN report says that other countries for which the humanitarian appeal was launched alongside Somalia, such as Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad, received 33%, 31% and 31% of their funding respectively and that shows Somalia is the lowest of the on list of international humanitarian attention and funding although the UN itself recognised Somalia humanitarian situation as ‘the worst in the world.’
This shortage of funds will have the following severe impacts on the humanitarian aid provision for the Somali needy millions, as the UN concedes: ‘The funding levels continue to reflect a pronounced imbalance between sectors. Food aid, which is 33 percent funded, accounts for 79 percent of funding received, with WFP receiving 40 percent of its total 2009 requirements. Education, Shelter and Safety & Security sectors have so far received no funding. Considering the deepening water crisis in many parts of Somalia, it is a major concern that Water & Sanitation has so far received only 2 percent of its funding requirement. The sector needs $37 million to urgently improve access to emergency water and sanitation services for drought-affected people in all parts of Somalia. The Health and Nutrition sector (15 percent funded) is another critical sector with limited funding availability, as the health part of the cluster has only received some 3.3 percent of its requirements, or $1.5 million. Up to 330,000 children under the age of five face acute malnutrition and possible death unless aid agencies are able to access $22 million over the coming months to provide emergency nutritional supplies.’ (55)
Because of this shortfall of funds, ‘the Cluster (is the all humanitarian agencies in Somalia taken together) is determined to reach at least 50 percent of the 3.2 million people in need of assistance, with a particular emphasis on marginalised populations, women and female headed households.’ (56)
7.2a Somalia Misses International Development Aid and Rescue Plans for Global economic Recession
Many developing countries have been benefiting from bilateral and international aid development funds but Somalia has been missing out all the following developmental or special rescue aid packages programmes during the last two decades:
a) Regional (e.g., E.U.), bilateral and international development aid
b) Millennium Development funds, and
c) Grant or aid rescue funds for off-setting the Global Economic Recession effects.
For the current severe global economic downturn most developed or developing countries alike either used emergent internal funds or external rescue funds to bail out their financial institutions, industries and trade from bankruptcy, supporting their currencies, and salvaging jobs and pensions, welfare and standard of living their peoples.
If there has been one or more of such aid funds to Somalia, I have no evidence of that. What I know as everybody else is that in all these years the international community have been providing Somalia goodwill but inadequate non-developmental humanitarian aid that has been enabling millions of Somalis to keep hand and mouth together in a desperate situation of a cycle of dependency and spiraling poverty and misery.
The IMF/World Bank disclosed that the ‘developing countries face a financing gap of 2270 billion to $700 billion this year (2009) as trade incomes dwindles and rich nations vie for capital to deal with global economic slowdown.’(57) The national governments of these countries have assessed the impact of the global economic recession on their economies and have drawn up plans to mitigate such effect and have asked a share of this international rescue plan funds. But the question is, what to extent the Global Economic Recession impacts on the Somali economy and standards of living and what plans have the international community has made to compensate them? What we know, as Somalis, is that the already highly precarious and vulnerable Somali socio-economic system has been hit hardest by the Ethiopian devastating destruction, severe droughts, and the current Global Economic Recession dispossessing and driving many more millions into destitution and abject poverty and starvation as narrated above. As a result of that, we also know that at present the lives of millions of Somalis are in real danger in such deep and widespread poverty, many more are fleeing out daily to escape famine and violence and many more prone to the same fate as specter of mass famine is looming on the near horizon.
7.3 Somali Death Toll Not Counted
The UN and other international community members have been counting the death toll of the conflict and displacement in Darfur in Sudan and publicised that 300,000 people have been killed by violence and starvation. But the same international actors (UN, INGOs, major countries) which involved in Somalia, have not come up with any Somali death toll figure resulting from the dire Somali humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the directly US-backed and indirectly backed UN and EU Ethiopian devastating occupation into an unprecedented catastrophe which the UN has described as ‘‘In terms of numbers and access to them Somalia is a worse displacement crisis than Darfur or Chad or anywhere else this year’ early on 13/5/2008 and again as ‘the worst humanitarian situation in the last 17 years’ on 12/9/2008.
Thus, the begging question is, why the Somali death toll from Somali driven conflict, or caused by Ethiopian massive socio-economic and displacement, killings and wounding, and/or the out-of-control grinding poverty has not been recorded and made public by the UN and other external actors dealing with Somalia?
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend to and urge the following parties:-
· To the Somali Transitional Unity Government:
a) to speak out loudly to both the Somali people especially the business community and dibad-joogga (Diaspora), and international community to raise awareness and draw more attention on the deep and widespread poverty and diseases prevailing in the country and make relevant urgent appeals to donate more humanitarian rescue funds for the millions of Somalis whose lives are threatened by such rampant and grinding poverty and diseases.
b) to launch a campaign and appoint a high level life-rescue Guddiga Qaranka ee Gurmadka Gargaarka iyo Horumarinta (National Emergency Relief and Development Committee) to make urgent to make urgent plans, surveys, and campaigns to raise resources and funds for saving the millions of lives at risk and to break with the cycle of turbulence, poverty, dependency and misery as a nation in coordination and cooperation with the international community.
To the Somali leadership elites: (politicians, intellectuals/professionals, religious leaders, etc.) who are out of government:
b)to be aware of and speak out the severe and rampant poverty and diseases decimating our people, make advocacy, awareness, and campaigns for collecting funds for rescue relief and development aid for our people helplessly languishing in widespread and grinding poverty and misery of all kinds. To do so, the Somali leadership elites, wherever they are, must organise themselves into various social and relief, economic, and political regional and national platforms inside and outside the country while engaging and cooperating with the international community. We are running out of time and more we wait and remain passive and purposeless, the more our nation heads into extinct given the dangerous circumstances surrounding it. .
· To the International Community (UN, US, EU, Arab Gulf Countries, etc.):
c)To raise the level of the current insufficient humanitarian aid by taking more proactive and concerted measures beyond the usual Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) in which Somalia is treated alongside other developing countries which are proportionally less afflicted and organise special urgent CAP for Somalia and/or organising special comprehensive Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Conference as there is no country as acutely affected as Somalia while also proactively supporting politically, financially and security wise the present Transitional Unity Government.
Ilaahow Aqoon-darro ha igu cadaabin, eexna ha iiga tagin (My God not punish me for ignorance, but do not exempt me for unfairness).
Omar Salad
Email: oselmi@hotmail.com7 May 2009
References:-
1. Robert Mister, 1980s, in Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, 2000, p.457.
2. John Holmes, the UN Chief For Humanitarian Affairs, 13/5/2007.
3. IRIN, 8/8/2008 Quotes UN OCHA.
4. UN News centre 26/12/2008.
5. FSAU, Post Gu’ and Post Deyr Analyses 2008/2009.
6. Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar, in Mike Whitney, Somalia: CIA-backed Coup Blows 2/12/208.
7. FSAU, 12/9/2008.
8. Jeffrey Gettleman, May 2008 in New York Times.
9. Mark Bowden, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, in RIN 1/9/2008.
10. IRIN, 5/12/2008.
11. FSAU, Post Gu’ and Post Deyr Analyses 2008/2009.
12. IRIN, 7/10/2008.
13. Idem
14. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vo.2 Issue 3, March 2009.
15. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: a country in Peril, A Policy Nightmare, 3/9/2008.
16. IRIN, 7/10/2008.
17. Idem
18. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vol.2 Issue 3, March 2009.
19. UN OCHA, 2/1/2009
20. IRIN, 2-6/3/2009
21. HiiraanOnline 25/3/2009.
22. IRIN, 25/3/2009.
23. IRIN, 15/3/2009 Quotes OCHA.
24. UNICEF Press Release, 5/12/2007.
25. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vol.1 Issue 5, May 2008.
26. UN OCHA, Report No. 27, 14/7/2008.
27. FSAU, Food Security and Nutrition Analyses, 12/9/2008.
28. IRIN, 5/12/2008.
29. AP, 8/12/008.
30. UN NEWS Centre
31. IRIN, 12/1/2009.
32. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vol.2 issue 3, March 2009.
33. UNICEF 12/1/2009
34. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview Vol. 2 Issue 3, march 2009.
35. FSAU, Food security and Nutrition Analyses 9/5/2008.
36. AFP, 13/9/2008 quotes FAO.
37. IRIN, 7/10/2008.
38. IRIN, 5/12/2008.
39. Somali shilling Wikipedia.
40. FSAU, Food Security and Nutrition analyses, 9/5/2008.
41. Idem
42. Idem
43. Dr. Omar Olad, in HiiraanOnline, 7/1/2008.
44. Idem
45. HiiraanOnline, 27/1/2009.
46. Collected from Mogadishu by Abdi. J. Farah (Abdi Dheere).
47. Idem
48. Idem
49. UN Somalia Humanitarian Overview, Vol.2 issue, march 2009.
50. Idem
51. IRIN, 12/1/2009.
52. Dr. Mauren Durkin, Health Intelligence, Sergievsky centre, Colombia University, NY, USA.
53. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia, address to the first Meeting of the TFG and ARS Joint security High Level Committee on 16/7/2008 in Djibouti.
54.The economist 2/10/2008 quotes Mr. Ould-Abdullah, the SRGS.
55. Mr. Ould-Abdullah, UN SRSG for Somalia, address at the international conference on piracy, in Nairobi, 10-/12/2008.
56. Un Somalia 56. 56. Humanitarian Overview vol. 2 issue 3, March 2009.
57.Idem
58. Proposals: FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance for Somalia January-December 2009.
59.Aljazeera, 10/3/2009.
